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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FLORA KESLER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
SHERMAN BRIMLEY TA TE and 
BUR TON L. TA TE, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
and 
TRANSNATIONAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Intervenor and Appellant. 
CASE NO. 
12806 
BRIEF OF APP'ELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff against the defendants, 
uninsured tort-feasors, for property damage and bodily 
injury sustained in an automobile accident. Plaintiff has 
uninsured motorist insurance coverage with appellant who 
seeks to enter this action as a party to protect its interests 
therein. Both plaintiff and defendants object to interven-
tion in this action by Transnational Insurance Company. 
l 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Upon becoming aware of the initiation of this action 
by plaintiff, her uninsured motorist carrier, Transnational 
Insurance Company, made a Motion for Leave to Inter. 
vene in this action in order to protect its interests therein. 
Upon the hearing of the company's Motion, which was 
resisted by both plaintiff and defendants, the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, Honorable James S. Sawaya, 
denied Transnational Insurance Company the right to in-
tervene in the action. It is from that Order that Intervenor 
appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Intervenor-Appellant, Transnational Insurance Com-
pany, seeks to have the Order of the Lower Court reversed 
which denied it the right to intervene in this action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 22, 1970, plaintiff, Flora Kesler, was 
driving her 1967 Chrysler automobile, and at the time in 
question was apparently stopped at the intersection of 
1300 South Street and State Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
in obedience to a red traffic semaphore (R 1, 4). Defeo· 
dant Sherman Tate, while driving a dump truck owned 
by his father, Burton L. Tate, collided with plaintiff's ve· 
hide. (R 1, 4). Plaintiff claims to have sustained personal 
injury in the accident (R 2), which allegations defend· 
ants deny. (R 4). The Tates also claim as an affirmative 
defense that the accident was unavoidable as to defendant 
Sherman Tate. (R 4). 
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Prior to the time of the accident referred to above, 
Transnational Insurance Company issued to plaintiff, 
Flora Kesler, its automobile liability insurance policy 
which provided, inter alia, coverage for damage or injury 
caused by uninsured motorists. (R 16, 18). The Tates did 
not have liability insurance on the truck which was in-
volved in the accident with plaintiff (R 16, 18), therefore 
the uninsured motorist coverage of plaintiff's policy with 
Transnational Insurance Company is applicable. 
Plaintiff filed her action against both defendants for 
property damage to her car and bodily injury to herself 
seeking a monetary award for general damages of $75,-
000.00, medical expenses of $400.00, loss of use of 
$220.00, Court costs and other relief which the Court 
deems proper. (R 1-2). Joel M. Allred, Salt Lake City at-
torney represents plaintiff in this action and Greg Hawk-
ins of the firm of Henriksen, Fairbourn and Tate repre-
sents the defendants. 
After the action was filed, appellant attempted to 
participate in the defense of the action but was refused 
such participation by defendants and their attorney. 
Thereafter, appellant, by and through its attorney, D. 
Gary Christian of the firm of Kipp and Christian filed its 
Motion or Leave to Intervene in the action claiming the 
right to litigate the matters of liability and damages by 
way of filing an answer to plaintiff's complaint as a de-
fendant intervenor in order to protect its interests. (R 16-
17). The Motion was argued before the Honorable James 
S. Sawaya, one of the Judges of the District Court of Salt 
Lake County on January 26, 1972. (R 41). At that time 
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all counsel appeared for and on behalf of their clients 
and the attorneys for plaintiff and defendants both resist-
ed the insurance company's Motion to Interevene. (R 41). 
After hearing argument from counsel for the re-
spective parties, the Court being fully advised in the 
premises entered its Order denying the Motion of Trans-
national Insurance Company to intervene in the action 
for the purpose of protecting its interests on the issues 
of liability and damages. (R 41-42). 
It is from that Order that the company has prosecuted 
this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENY-
ING THE MOTION OF TRANSNATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY FOR LEAVE TO 
INTERVENE IN THIS ACTION. 
Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure deals with ' 
intervention of right in certain legal actions. The rule 
provides as follows: 
Intervention of Right. Upon timely applica· 
1 
tion anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an 
1 
action: (1) when a statute confers an unconditional 
right to intervene; or (2) when representation of 
the applicant's interests by existing parties is or 
may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be 
bound by a judgment in the action; or ( 3) * * * * 
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The question therefore presented by this appeal is 
whether or not Transnational Insurance Company has 
the right to intervene in this action under the provisions 
of Rule 24(a) and the facts of this case. 
Appellant is unable to find any Utah cases directly 
in point dealing with the question here presented for con-
sideration. There are, however, cases which deal with 
who may intervene and the requisite elements necessary 
for such intervention. 
In Dayton vs. Free, 49 Utah 221, 162 Pac. 614, the 
Court held that the right to intervene is not limited to any 
particular kind of action or proceeding. The intervenor 
must have the requisite interest in the matter in litigation 
and the interest must be a pecuniary one, not merely a 
wish or a strong desire that either party should succeed. 
The test usually applied to the right to intervene is 
whether the person seeking intervention may gain or lose 
by direct legal operation and the effect of the judgment 
ultimately entered in the matter. Commercial Block 
Realty Co. vs. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 83 
Utah 414, 28 Pac.2d 1081. 
In 67 C.J.S. Parties Sec. 59(d) it states: 
Intervention by a person primarily or ulti-
mately liable to one of the parties with respect to 
the claim in suit has been considered proper where 
the requisites for intervention are otherwise 
present. 
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Appellant respectfully asserts that on the basis of 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the tests set 
forth in the cases quoted that it should be permitted to 
intervene in this action. Certainly Transnational Insur-
ance Company is not represented in this action and coun. 
sel for both plaintiff and defendants have resisted the 
Company's efforts to have its counsel represent its interests 
in this suit. It appears obvious that appellant is or may be 
bound by a judgment in this action in favor of plaintiff 
and against defendants. The interest of the company 
herein is a pecuniary interest since it is the only one who 
will respond in money paid on any judgment entered. If 
it is required so to do Transnational Insurance Company 
would certainly lose as the Court determined in Com· 
mercial Block Realty Co. vs. United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Co., supra. 
Even though there are no Utah cases which have 
previously dealt with this problem, there are cases from 
other jurisdictions directly supporting the right of an 
insurance carrier, such as appellant herein, to intervene 
in cases like the one at hand. 
In Matthews vs. Allstate Insurance Company, 194 
F. Supp. 459 (1961) the Federal District Court in Virginia 
was faced with an action by an insured occupant of an 
automobile to recover from her insurance carrier the 
amount of an unpaid judgment that she had obtained 
against an uninsured motorist. The Court held the in· 
surer liable to the plaintiff insured for the amount of the 
judgment even though the insurer wasn't a party to the 
action indicating that the insurance company could have 
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intervened in the action had it chosen to do so. Since it 
did not intervene, having had a right to do so, the in-
surer was bound by the judgment even though its interests 
may not have been protected. In discussing the company's 
liability the Court said: 
Since the requirement of establishing legal 
liability of the uninsured motorist has been fully 
met by the plaintiff herein, the defendant's lia-
bility automatically attaches to that extent. Id. at 
465. 
Again the Court said: 
There is little doubt that the state court, with 
knowledge of the interest of the insurance com-
pany, would have appointed defendant's counsel 
as the attorney for Manning and Singleton. Id. 
at 464. 
In disposing of the case the Court noted that even though 
Virginia has a statute prohibiting the joinder of an in-
surance company as a party defendant in such cases, the 
statute did not prevent intervention since "the statute is 
undoubtedly for the benefit of the insurer and does not 
foreclose the right to be added as a party defendant at its 
request where it is clear that the insurer has a definite 
interest in the action" and where all other avenues of 
appearance and defense are closed. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
vs. Lester E. Brown, et al., 114 Ga. App. 650, 152 SE2d 
641 (1966) was a case in which Brown brought suit 
against one Blakely as defendant and State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company as nominal defendant 
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for damages arising out of an automobile collision alleg-
edly caused by the negligence of Blakely. Blakely was an 
uninsured motorist and State Farm had issued an auto-
mobile liability insurance policy to Brown which provid-
ed for uninsured motorist coverage. The trial court over. 
ruled the insurer's general demurrer and motion to purge, 
but granted its application to intervene, and the insurer 
appealed and plaintiff cross-appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals held that the insurer could not be made a party 
defendant, but had a right to intervene, even though the 
case was not in default. 
In discussing the insurance company's application to 
intervene the Court stated at 152 SE2d 641, page 646: 
We recently held that under the uninsured 
motorists law the plaintiff's insurer has a constitu· 
tional right to urge, inter alia, the non-liability 
of the uninsured motorist where the case is in de-
fault as to him to contest the jurisdiction of the 
court. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. vs. 
Glover, supra. We are unable to distinguish this 
decision on the ground that the case was in default 
as to the uninsured motorist, and we conclude that 
it must be followed. 
The Court further said at page 646: 
The insurer does have a direct and immediate 
interest to protect in this kind of action, and it 
stands to lose or gain by the direct effect of the 
judgment. 
The case of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company vs. Glover is reported at 113 Ga.App. 815, 149 
S.E.2d 852. 
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See also, Lamb vs. Horwick, 48 Ill.App.2d 251, 198 
N.E.2d 194; Wert vs. Burke, 47 Ill.App.2d 453, 197 
N.E.2d 717; Alston vs. Amalgamated Mutual Casualty 
Company, 53 Misc.2d 90, 278 N.Y.S.2d 906. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
vs. Jiles, 115 Ga.App. 193, 154 S.E.2d 286 (1967) was an 
action by a wife against a motorist for injuries received 
in a collision between automobiles operated by an unin-
sured motorist and her husband and the husband's action 
for medical expenses incurred on behalf of his wife, loss 
of her services, property damage to his automobile, and 
loss of use thereof. Plaintiffs' uninsured motorist insurer 
petitioned for intervention and moved for consolidation of 
the cases. The Trial Court sustained general demurrers 
and the insurer appealed. The Court of Appeals held that 
the insurer was entitled to intervene, but that the actions 
were not the kind which could be consolidated. 
Another case which lends support to the holdings in 
those cases discussed above is Indiana Insurance Company 
vs. Noble, 265 N.E.2d 419 (Ind., 1970). That case involv-
ed an action to recover under the uninsured motorist pro-
vision of an automobile liability insurance policy. The 
Trial Court granted the insured's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and the insurer appealed. The Appellate Court 
held that although the 17 year old insured, through her 
next friend, filed an action against the uninsured motorist 
above without joining the insurer as a party defendant 
to litigate the issues of liability and damages, and where 
the insured had given preliminary and adequate notice 
of the filing and pendency of the action to the insurer 
9 
so that it could have taken appropriate action including 
intervention, the resulting judgment against the uninsur. 
ed motorist was binding on the insurer absent any show. 
ing of fraud, misrepresentation or collusion. 
See also, Wells vs. Hartford Accident & Indemnity 
Company, 459 S.W.2d 259 (1970) for cases cited by the 
court where insurers were estopped from relitigating is-
sues in an action brought by an insured against the unin-
sured motorist when the insurer could have intervened in 
order to protect its interests. 
It is apparent that the interest of appellant, Trans· 
national Insurance Company, is a pecuniary one, and this 
is coupled with the fact that the company will be affected 
and will stand to lose or gain by direct legal operation of 
any judgment that may be granted. Also, to be considered 
with this set of circumstances is the fact that the company 
does not have any control over the defense of the action. 
As it now stands counsel for plaintiff and defendants 
could stipulate to a judgment in favor of plaintiff and 
against defendants without the right of appellant to say 
then yea or nay. After such action then plaintiff could 
then initiate an action against appellant on the policy 
thereby obviating appellant's right and the necessity of 
litigating the issues of liability and damages. It should 
be made clear that appellant does not contend or allege 
that counsel for the parties are going to so act at this 
time; however, appellant is subject to that risk. 
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To be considered further in this matter is the fact 
that if appellant does not seek to intervene in this action 
in order to protect its interests it will in all probability 
be estopped to do so in a subsequent action by plaintiff 
on the uninsured motorist provision of the policy. It 
would seem that the equities of the situation dictate that 
appellant be permitted to intervene in this action to rea-
sonably protect its interests. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing argument and authorities, 
appellant takes the position that this Court should re-
verse the order of the District Court denying appellant 
leave to intervene in the above-entitled action for the 
purposes of having the issues of liability and damages 
fully litigated in order that appellant's interests in this 
matter be adequately protected. 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. GARY CHRISTIAN, ESQ. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN 
520 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appelltmt 
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